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Abstract  
We explore how a firm-level tax on redistributed foreign profits affects the 
choices of a multinational enterprise (MNE) using evidence from a recent tax 
reform in Finland. The so-called equalization tax (EQT) used to be a regular 
element of European imputation systems, designed to ensure that dividends were 
not paid out of un-taxed profits. Theoretical analyses have suggested that EQT 
may distort several choices of MNEs. We find a 23 per cent increase in dividend 
payments and a similar increase in repatriated foreign profits after the repeal of 
EQT. The reported profits of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs also 
increased, which indicates an effect on profit shifting. No change in investment 
was detected. 
Key words: Dividend taxation, financial decisions, multinational enterprise, tax 
reform 
JEL classification numbers: H25, F23, H32  
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan miten Suomessa vuonna 2005 poistunut 
täydennysvero vaikutti monikansallisten yritysten päätöksiin. Täydennysvero oli 
tärkeä osa eurooppalaisia yhtiöveron hyvitysjärjestelmiä. Sen tavoitteena oli 
turvata kotimainen yhteisöverotuotto. Aiemman teoreettisen kirjallisuuden 
perusteella täydennysvero aiheutti vääristymiä monikansallisten yhtiöiden 
voitonjakopäätöksiin. Empiiristen tulosten perusteella monikansallisten yritysten 
emoyhtiöt lisäsivät osingonjakoa noin 23 prosenttiyksiköllä ja samalla myös 
tytäryhtiöiltä kotiutettujen osinkojen määrä lisääntyi täydennysveron poistumisen 
jälkeen. Lisäksi tytäryhtiöiden ulkomailla raportoimat voitot lisääntyivät, mikä 
viittaa muutokseen peitellyssä voiton siirrossa konsernin sisällä. Investointi-
vaikutuksia ei havaittu. 
Asiasanat: Yhtiöveron hyvitysjärjestelmä, monikansalliset yritykset, täydennys-
vero, voitonjakopäätökset, verouudistus 






In recent decades multinational enterprises (MNEs) have notably
increased their role in the world economy. There is also widening
evidence of the remarkable ability of MNEs to exploit cross-country
differences in tax systems. These developments have led to a growing
interest in international tax design issues among policymakers and
academics.
Therefore it is no surprise that several OECD countries have re-
formed their corporate tax systems in recent years. A common trend
in Europe has been to switch from an imputation system to clas-
sical corporate tax with reduced tax rates.1 This includes the four
largest EU Member States as well as Ireland, Norway and Finland.
The European trend can be explained at least partly by a series of
rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), where imputation
systems were found to be inconsistent with the EU Treaties.2 The
case against them turned on discrimination against either foreign
shareholders or foreign corporations.3
One of the challenged features of European imputation systems
was the so called equalization tax (EQT) and its counterparts.4 The
aim of these measures was to protect domestic tax revenues by ensur-
ing that no dividends can be distributed from profits, which are not
subject to domestic corporate tax. EQT served this goal by levying
an extra corporate-level tax if dividends were financed from tax-
exempt (or leniently taxed) profits. An EQT liability was especially
1The imputation system is a method to relieve double taxation of distributed
corporate profits. It gives the shareholders a credit for taxes paid by the com-
pany,which can be offset against income tax on dividends. Imputation systems
are still applied in several OECD countries such as Australia, Canada and New
Zealand.
2See European Commission (2003). See also the ruling by the ECJ on the so-
called Manninen case (Case C-319/02), issued on 7 September 2004. The ruling
held that the Finnish imputation system, which limited imputation credits to
domestic source dividends, violated the free movement of capital principle in the
EC Treaty. This ruling was an important factor behind the Finnish government’s
decision to abolish the imputation system as from 2005.
3A further reason for the repeal of imputation systems might have been the
non-optimality of personal-level double tax reliefs in open economy claimed by
Boadway and Bruce (1992).
4The main alternative to EQT was the system of differentiated credit. Under
this method, redistribution of tax exempt foreign profits did not trigger EQT.
However, such dividends did not give entitlement to imputation credit either.
In mid1990s both Germany and the UK switched from EQT to differentiated
credit.
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common in cases where a company had foreign source income which
was tax-exempt to relieve international double taxation. The conse-
quent extra tax burden on foreign profits and its potential harmful
effects on economic activity were recognized in the European tax co-
ordination debate (Ruding Committee, 1992), but also by national
governments who soon implemented amendments to their tax rules.5
Given the growing role of MNEs and the difficulties in designing
their taxation, there has been surprisingly little research establish-
ing causal evidence between taxes and the behavior of MNEs. In
this study we use the Finnish tax reform of 2005, which abolished
EQT, as a natural experiment to examine the behavioral responses
of MNEs to taxes.6 Because of the opportunity to use valid policy
evaluation methods, we believe that our study offers a novel contri-
bution to this field of public economics.
Our main interest lies in the effects of EQT on dividends, invest-
ments and the use of alternative channels to repatriate foreign profits
from abroad. The unique firm-level data based on tax returns allow
us to examine closely various decisions by companies. In consider-
ing profit shifting responses we apply data for Swedish and Finnish
based corporate groups included in the Amadeus database.
We also aim to contribute to the empirical analyses of the Finnish
2005 tax reform. The reform involved a substantial rise in personal-
level taxes of dividends. Kari et al. (2008) observed a strong an-
ticipation effect in dividends among both listed and non-listed com-
panies before the reform. Kari et al. (2009) found a clear nega-
tive effect on dividends in non-listed companies but no effect among
listed firms after the reform. Both papers focused on personal-level
changes in dividend taxation and ignored the changes in company-
level tax structures such as EQT. As theoretical analyses suggest,
however, EQT may have had important effects on incentives among
firms with foreign operations. Thus one of the goals of our paper is
to add to the earlier literature on the reform.
How should we expect taxes on dividend payments to affect choices?
Public economics literature includes two well known opposite hy-
potheses on the effects of dividend taxes. The “new view” claims
that these taxes will capitalize into share prizes, but have no effects
5See for example Weichenrieder, (1994), for Germany and Freeman and Grif-
fith, (1993), for the UK.
6Other aspects of TR2005 have been analyzed by Kari et al. (2008, 2009)
and Korkeama¨ki et al. (2009).
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on investment or dividend payments. The “old view” predicts that
dividends and investment are dependent on dividend taxes. The so-
called Hartman-Sinn hypothesis is an application of the ”new view”
to the international environment. It suggests that a subsidiary’s
long-run capital stock and dividend repatriations are independent
of a potential tax liability due on repatriation of the profits (see
Sinn, 1987)7.
Besides traditional dividend tax issues, previous literature has
also addressed several aspects of imputation systems. Freeman and
Griffith (1993) provide a policy discussion on the effects of ‘surplus
ACT’, the British variant of EQT. Devereux and Freeman (1995) an-
alyze how imputation systems affect international investment flows.
Weichenrieder (1994, 1998) constructs a dynamic MNE model in the
“new view” tradition to investigate incentive aspects of the German
system of differentiated credit and shows that it affects dividends
and lowers the parent company’s cost of capital for investments.
Kari and Yla¨-Liedenpohja (2005) analyze EQT in a similar MNE
model and argue that it has identical implications for dividend and
investment policies as differentiated credit. They further show that
EQT tends to increase incentives to shift foreign profits to the home
country using transfer pricing.
Empirical literature on the effects of imputation systems on the
behavior of MNEs is scant and focuses solely on the UK applica-
tion. Bond et al. (1996) examine the effects of the tax cost of pay-
ing dividends resulting from surplus ACT in the UK. They report
a negative effect on dividend payments. Bond et al. (2007) exam-
ine the effects of the abolition of repayable imputation credits for
UK pension funds in July 1997 and report an increase in dividend
payments among firms benefiting most from the reform. Neither
study finds evidence of changes in investment. The implications of
imputation systems for the international allocation of profits have
not been studied empirically.8
7Subsequent research has tried to challenge and test this view. Desai et al.
(2001, 2007) and Bellak et al. (2010) analyze the effects of repatriation taxes
empirically and argue that they have an influence on dividends, but nevertheless
repatriations are fairly persistent and seem to follow a target pay-out ratio.
Desai et al. (2007) refer to information asymmetries and monitoring motives as
major determinants of repatriation policies.
8However, a growing empirical literature studies the effects of taxes on inter-
national profit shifting more generally, see for example Hines and Rice (1994),
Clausing (2003), Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga and Laeven
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Our estimation method is a simple linear difference-in-differences
approach. It allows us to evaluate the causal effect of the abolition
of EQT on firms which faced a high risk of being liable to pay EQT
on distributed dividends (MNEs). Our control group is formulated
from other large firms which were not at risk of EQT liability before
the reform. Consistent with theory, the empirical results suggest
that affected firms increased their dividend payments considerably,
by approximately 23 per cent. We also find that repatriation of for-
eign profits in the form of intra-company dividends increased after
the repeal of EQT. Furthermore, we observe an increase in the re-
ported profits of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, suggesting a
decrease in profit-shifting. However, we cannot observe statistically
significant changes in the level of real or financial investments. Our
results emphasize the sensitivity of dividend decisions to taxes both
outside and inside an MNE and hence they provide similar evidence
as the previous empirical literature, including the study by Bond et
al. (1996). The natural experiment approach concerning the effects
on profit-shifting is generally novel and especially so in the literature
dealing with imputation systems.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces an overview
of the elements of the tax system in question. Section 3 presents
the theoretical background and the hypotheses to be tested in our
empirical analysis. Section 4 is devoted to empirical analysis and
Section 5 summarizes.
2 The taxation of dividends in Finland
We briefly summarize the main elements of dividend taxation before
and after the 2005 tax reform. A full imputation system was adopted
as a part of a larger base-broadening and tax rate-cutting tax reform,
as from 1990. After the reform, corporation tax was fully credited
against the tax liability of a shareholder paid by the company on
distributed profits. Following its European predecessors in France,
Germany and the UK, EQT was an elementary part of the system.
This regime operated for 15 years until 2004. As from the begin-
ning of 2005 the imputation system (including EQT) was repealed
and a partial double tax of dividends introduced. The main rule
was that 70 per cent of dividends were recognized as taxable capital
(2008).
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income. Substantial reliefs for dividends from non-listed companies
were maintained. Corporate tax was cut from 29 to 26 per cent
and the flat tax rate on personal-level capital income from 29 to 28
per cent.9 An exemption method was introduced for the taxation of
capital gains from the sale of shares and for taxation of dividends
received by corporations. The exemption for dividends was ruled
not to apply to the investment assets of financial sector firms.
The operational principle of EQT is to make sure that no divi-
dends which are entitled to imputation credit are distributed out of
profits not subject to the full domestic corporate tax. The ways of
implementing this idea varied somewhat in different countries but
the goals were very similar. In Finland EQT liability was due if the
so called minimum corporate tax (MT ) exceeded preliminary cor-
porate tax (CT ). MT was equal to the imputation credit granted
to the shareholder and it was calculated MT = sG/(1 − s), where
G is dividends and s is the rate of imputation credit. Henceforth
we depict τe = s/(1 − s) and call τe the rate of EQT. In Fin-
land corporate tax was fully credited to shareholders and there-
fore s was equal in size to the rate of corporate tax, τ , implying
τe = τ/(1− τ). Preliminary corporate tax was defined CT = τ ∗ Πˆ,
where Πˆ is taxable profit. The amount levied as EQT was calculated
EQT = max (MT − CT, 0).
Two additional complicating aspects must be mentioned. The
first is an inter-temporal smoothing mechanism. Due to the volatil-
ity of profits some considered it not reasonable to levy EQT if div-
idend distribution exceeds annual taxable profits in a year when
profits are exceptionally low. Thus the tax system allowed taxed
domestic profits from previous years to be taken into account. To
implement this idea a concept of tax surpluses was introduced. It
was defined as taxes paid on retained profits from a time interval
which was initially five years and later ten years. Hence tax sur-





where t refers to the current fiscal year. Where old tax surpluses
9Since 1993 Finland had operated a dual income tax where tax rate on capital
income is proportional. Earlier analyses on the 2005 tax reform include Kari et
al. (2008) and Korkeama¨ki et al. (2010).
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were required to reduce the equalization tax liability, the oldest un-
used tax surpluses were used first (first-in-first-out rule).
As from 1996, a relief was introduced in the case of dividends
repatriated from abroad and redistributed to foreign shareholders
(flow-through dividends). Introduction of this relief reflected the
problems of an imputation system in an open economy with cross-
border ownership. The relief was calculated as:
A = min(G, D∗),
where GF depicts dividends distributed to foreign shareholders
and D∗ foreign profits repatriated as tax-exempt dividends under
the exemption method operated by Finland. The relief was deducted
from dividends G when calculating the minimum tax, i.e.
MT = τe(G− A).
Taking into account these two qualifications the EQT liability
was calculated as follows:
EQT = max(MT–(CT + TS), 0).
Next we illustrate how EQT works by means of an example. As-
sume an MNE consisting of a parent company resident in Finland
and a subsidiary resident in Germany. The parent’s pre-tax profit
is 100 of which 50 is a result of foreign-source dividends. These div-
idends are tax-exempt because of the exemption method applied to
relieve international double taxation. The rest of the pre-tax profit,
50, is earned from business operations in Finland and is subject to
corporate tax at rate 29 %. Hence, the MNE’s corporate tax liability
is 14,5.
To consider the potential tax implications of dividend distribu-
tions, assume that the parent has no tax surpluses from previous
years and that the dividend recipients are domestic individuals and
institutions. If the MNE distributes no more than 35,5, i.e. it dis-
tributes its taxable domestic profit after taxes, no EQT liability is
due. However, if its dividend exceeds 35,5, it pays 29 cents in EQT
for every euro exceeding the threshold. If the MNE distributes its
entire after-tax profit, its EQT liability is 14,5. The MNE can avoid
this extra tax cost on dividend distributions simply by cutting its
dividends so that only domestic after tax profit is distributed and
6
by investing the rest in the parent’s home country. The next section
examines the incentive effects of EQT using a formal model.
3 Theoretical predictions
We will draw the hypotheses for our empirical analysis by consid-
ering EQT in an infinite-horizon dynamic MNE model.10 We show
that EQT creates an extra tax cost for dividend payments financed
from foreign source profits, which leads to changes in the MNEs div-
idend, investment and repatriation policies. The conclusions on the
effects of the repeal of EQT are judged by comparing the optimal
choices of the firm with and without EQT. We begin by laying out
the model framework and then move to the analysis and discussion.
The presentation draws much on Kari and Yla¨-Liedenpohja (2005).
3.1 The dynamic MNE model with EQT
Consider a value maximizing MNE that consists of a parent com-
pany, resident in the home country (h-country), and a subsidiary,
operating in a foreign country (f-country). The parent produces at
home using capital K as the only production factor. Let Π(K) be
operating profits with standard properties Π’ > 0 and Π”< 0. The
parent’s budget constraint is11
Π(K) +Q+D∗ + C = G+ I + T, (1)
where the sources of funds are domestic profits Π(K), proceeds
from new share issues Q, foreign source intra-company dividends D∗,
and profits of foreign origin C, shifted from the subsidiary for the
parent. We leave out debt finance to simplify the analysis. Funds
are spent on dividend distributions G to shareholders, h-country
investment I and h-country taxes T .
The subsidiary’s budget constraint is
10The model builds on the “new view” theory developed by King (1974) and
others, extended to the international context by Hartman (1985), Sinn (1984,
1993), Alworth (1988) and Keen (1991). Weichenrieder (1995, 1998) and Kari
and Yla¨-Liedenpohja (2005) have used the set-up to analyze elements of impu-
tation systems. Altschuler and Grubert (2002) discuss the limitations of the
standard model, particularly they focus on a narrow set of financial flows be-
tween the parent and its single affiliate.
11The starred variables refer to the f-country.
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Π(K∗) = D∗ + I∗ + C + c(C) + T ∗. (2)
The source of funds is operating profit Π(K∗) earned on invest-
ments located in the f-country. The funds are used for dividend
repatriations D∗ for the parent, local physical investment I∗, profit-
shifting via transfer pricing C and f-country taxes T ∗. Profit-shifting
is assumed to cause administrative and efficiency costs c(C) with the
properties c’ > 0, c”> 0, borne by the subsidiary.
The MNE chooses dividends, investments at home and abroad,
equity issues, intra-company dividends and shifted profits to maxi-








where γG with γ = (1 − τp)/(1 − s) denotes after-tax dividends
received by the shareholder. τp is the tax rate on capital income and
s is the rate of imputation credit. For full imputation s = τ and
for partial imputation 0 < s < τ , where τ is the rate of corporate
tax. We assume τp ≥ τ , which implies γ ≤ 1. ρ = (1 − τp)r is
the after-tax discount rate. To simplify, we assume no owner-level
capital gains taxation.
The first step to model EQT in this framework is to split divi-
dends G into two parts
G = D +De, (4)
where D denotes dividends financed from after-tax domestic prof-
its (normal dividend) and De refers to that part of dividends which
exceeds the amount of domestic profits and thus triggers an equal-
ization tax payment (excess dividend).
We constrain normal dividend D to the h-country taxable profit
after taxes:
D ≤ (1− τ)Πˆ with Πˆ = [Π(K) + C]. (5)
Observe that Πˆ includes C, i.e. profits earned in the f-country but
shifted to the h-country using transfer pricing. If the firm distributes
more than the after tax profit, it must set De > 0 and is then liable
to pay EQT.
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The parent’s and the subsidiary’s taxes T and T ∗ are defined as
T = τ [Π(K) + C] + τeDe, T
∗ = τ ∗[Π(K∗)–C–c(C)], (6)
where T consists of the domestic corporation tax at rate τ and
EQT at rate τe. The h-country is assumed to grant international
double-tax relief using the exemption method. Hence, repatriated
dividend D∗ is tax-exempt and does not show up in T . The sub-
sidiary’s taxes T ∗ consist of the f-country corporation tax, the base
of which is profits from local production less income shifted to the
parent, including costs.
3.2 The MNE’s optimal policy
Consider now the MNEs optimal policy in the presence of EQT.
It makes sense to start with the financing choices of the parent
and then move to investment and repatriation policies. We use a
heuristic approach here to demonstrate the effects of EQT. A formal
derivation is given in Appendix 1.
In our model with no debt there are three sources from which
the parent may finance additional h-country investments: domestic
profits (normal dividends), repatriated foreign profits (excess divi-
dends), and new share issues. A useful way to consider the effects
of tax rules on financing choices is to compare the costs of small
increases in financing while keeping the effect on investment con-
stant.12 If the parent decides to retain one euro of its domestic profits
after corporate taxes, the shareholder foregoes (1− τp)/(1− s) after
taxes. The owner’s income is only reduced by owner-level income
tax (τp) net of imputation credit (s).
The corresponding cost for retaining one euro of foreign profits is
(1− τp)/[(1− s)(1 + τe)]. Now the owner’s income is again reduced
by owner-level taxes but also by EQT.13 Finally, the cost for new
equity is 1 since equity capital can be invested in and withdrawn
from a corporation without tax implications.
Using the assumption (1 − τp)/(1 − s) ≤ 1, we may draw the
following “pecking order” for the alternative financing forms:
12More formally, compare the partial differentials of the Lagrangean in respect
of dividend variables and new equity, see Appendix 1.
13If the one euro is spent on dividends, the firm pays τe/(1+ τe) in EQT and
distributes the rest 1/(1 + τe). The owner’s net income after personal taxes is
then (1− τp)/[(1− s)(1 + τe)].
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foreign profits ≻ domestic profits % new equity
Foreign profits are unambiguously the most preferred form of
financing while domestic profits are preferred or equal to new equity
depending on the sizes of s and τp.14 The position of foreign profits
as the most favoured source is solely determined by EQT.15
Consider next the effects of EQT on the parent’s investment.
This can be accomplished by deriving the cost of capital of real in-
vestment financed from foreign repatriated profits (marginal source
of finance). As demonstrated above, the cost of retaining one euro
of foreign profits is (1 − τp)/[(1 − s)(1 + τe)]. On the other hand,
investing the retained one euro internally gives the parent an income
flow of (1 − τ)Π’ after corporate tax. Assuming the net return is
distributed as dividends, the owner receives a net income flow of
(1− τ)Π’(1− τp)/(1− s). Using the owner’s after-tax interest rate,
ρ = (1−τp)r, as the discount rate, we may calculate its present value
to be (1− τ)Π’/[r(1− s)]. This gives the contribution of the invest-
ment to the market value of the MNE. In equilibrium the costs and
benefits (the present value of the returns) of the investment equal.
By solving the marginal return on capital, we may draw the MNEs
long-run cost of capital in the presence of EQT:
Π’(K) =
1− τp
(1− τ)(1 + τe)
r. (7)
Observe first that the cost of capital in (7) is not affected by the
imputation rate s. This neutrality result follows from the new view
of dividend taxation. However, the denominator of the expression
on the right-hand side of (7) includes τe, reflecting the effect of EQT.
Without EQT but retaining other features of the tax system,
the cost of capital is Π’ = (1 − τp)r/(1 − τ). We conclude that
EQT lowers the h-country cost of capital below the benchmark level
and hence increases investments. In fact, the tax rate condition
τp ≥ τ ensures that the cost of capital is always lower than the
market rate of interest r. In the case of a full imputation system
14In a partial imputation system (s < τ) domestic profits are strictly preferred
to new equity. In full imputation (s = τ) with τp = τ indifference occurs.
15Observe that without the imputation system (s = τe = 0), but retain-
ing other aspects of the model, the pecking order becomes foreign profits ≈
domestic profits ≻ new equity.
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(τp = τ/(1−τ)) condition (7) becomes Π’ = (1−τp)r. Now the cost
of capital corresponds to the owner’s after-tax interest rate which
reflects strong investment incentives.
The intuition of these results is straightforward: EQT affects the
costs and returns of investment differently. It reduces the costs, but
leaves, unlike a standard dividend tax, the returns on investment
intact. Therefore its effects do not cancel out but rather lead to a
rise in incentives to invest.
Kari and Yla¨-Liedenpohja (2005) extend the model to include
the parent’s investments in financial assets, F , yielding a return at
a fixed rate i = r. In this case the firm does not accept a return on
real investments lower than the market interest rate. The optimal
stock of real capital is determined by the condition Π’(K) = r. After
this size ofK is reached, all repatriated foreign profits are invested in
financial assets dF/dt = D∗. Only h-country profits are distributed,
and these now include the returns on financial investments, G =
D = Π(K) + iF .16
Observe that dividends D distributed by the parent grow in this
regime. This is because the growth in financial assets leads to an
increase in domestic profits and this relieves the upper limit of D.
Hence, by investing the repatriated foreign profits in the h-country,
the parent, in a way, transforms these profits into domestic prof-
its which can be paid out without EQT liability (Kari and Yla¨-
Liedenpohja 2005, Altschuler and Grubert 2002). Only domestic
profits are distributed. The constraint in (5) binds permanently.
Hence, EQT effectively establishes an upper limit on the parent’s
dividends which is gradually relieved when financial assets accumu-
late.
The MNE has two alternative ways to repatriate foreign profits,
intra-company dividends, D∗ and profit shifting using transfer pric-
ing, C. We disregarded the latter alternative but we now perform
an analysis of it. The incentives to use transfer pricing rather than
dividends can again be examined by considering the costs and bene-
fits of a policy change where intra-company dividends before foreign
corporate tax are reduced by one euro and the transfer-priced profit
increased correspondingly.
16Adding debt into the model would produce a similar steady-state regime
where EQT generates incentives to pay back debt accumulated earlier to finance
the stock of real capital. Weichenrieder (1998) elaborates this solution in the
case of the German system of differentiated credit.
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If the MNE reduces foreign-source pre-tax dividends by one euro,
the shareholder foregoes a dividend net of tax of (1−τ ∗)(1−τp)/[(1−
s)(1+ τe)]. In this expression the owner’s income is reduced first by
foreign corporate tax (τ ∗), then by EQT after the foreign-source div-
idend is redistributed (τe), and, finally by personal-level dividend
taxes (τp) net of imputation credit (s). The reduction in foreign
dividends enables the MNE to increase the profit shifted to the h-
country by one euro. This raises the shareholder’s net income by
(1−τ)(1−τp)/(1−s). The dividend only is subject to h-country cor-
porate tax (τ) and owner-level dividend tax (τp) net of imputation
credit (s). No f-country corporate tax or EQT is paid because the
profit, even if earned abroad, is reported in the h-country. There is a
further source of costs caused by the policy change, namely admin-
istrative and efficiency costs from profit-shifting c(C), assumed to
grow at an increasing rate. It is useful first to assume that this cost
is close to zero for the very small change in shifted profits. Hence we
focus on the first two components of costs and benefits. We obtain
the following condition:
1− τ ∗
















The left-hand side of the tax rate condition gives the relative
value of distributed profit when the profit is reported abroad and
repatriated as intra-company dividends D∗ and the right-hand side
is the value when profit is transferred to the h-country using profit-
shifting and reported there. If the right-hand side is greater than
the left-hand side, then the transfer pricing channel is preferred and
vice versa.
Without EQT the condition is (1 − τ) > (1 − τ ∗). The MNE
chooses transfer pricing if the h-country tax rate is lower than the f-
country rate. Profits will be reported in the country with the lowest
tax burden. With EQT the relative sizes of τ and τ ∗ still matter
but now EQT increases the probability of profit-shifting being used.
In the case of full imputation the transfer pricing always dominates
since (1 + τe) = 1/(1− τ).
Recall that profit shifting causes costs and assume that it is the
preferred repatriation policy (“<” holds in eq. 8). Now, if the
marginal costs and benefits of transfer pricing balance at a level of C
12
lower than foreign profit after costs, C < Π(K∗)− c(C), an internal
equilibrium occurs where foreign profit is channelled using transfer
pricing up to an equilibrium amount Cˆ and the rest is repatriated as
intra-company dividends Dˆ∗. In this equilibrium, the mature MNE
invests the latter amount in financial assets and distributes the after-
tax h-country profit as dividends. Two ways to avoid EQT are in
use, transfer pricing and re-investing foreign-source dividends in fi-
nancial assets. Observe that foreign intra-company dividends are
still the marginal source of financing and therefore the above con-
siderations concerning the effects of EQT on investment incentives
still hold.
The results derived above from the standard MNE model17 pro-
vide us with the following behavioral hypotheses for the empirical
analysis. Because of the repeal of EQT as from 2005 we expect
Finnish MNEs to have:
 increased their dividends to shareholders,
 decreased h-country real or financial investments,
 increased intra-company dividends and decreased profit-shifting
as a way of repatriating profits from abroad.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Method
We apply a standard difference-in-difference (DD) method to esti-
mate the changes in the behavior of firms in response to the abolition
of EQT in 2005. The treatment group consists of all Finnish MNEs
operating during 2000-2002. In our main estimations the control
group consists of other large listed Finnish corporations. Since the
abolition of EQT affected these relatively large corporations (MNEs)
in particular, we exclude small firms from our sample to make the
groups more comparable to each other. When we investigate profit-
shifting responses, we use Swedish multinationals and their sub-
sidiaries as our control group.
17Altschuler and Grubert (2002) extend the simple standard model to include
several subsidiaries, investments in financial assets abroad and investments be-
tween subsidiaries of the MNE. While such extensions are important to under-
stand MNEs’ decisions more generally, we believe that our model is sufficient to
demonstrate the central incentive effects on the parent’s decisions.
13
The estimated DD equation is the following
Log(Yit) = αi+βcontrolsit+δaftert+γtreati∗aftert+ηi+εit, (9)
where Y refers to the dependent variable in firm i at time t. We
have several dependent variables in our analysis: dividend payments,
real investments, financial investments, repatriated profits and re-
ported profits at home and abroad, which are all in a logarithmic
form to deal with the skewed outcomes.18 The variable treat is a
dummy variable with a value of one if the firm is a Finnish MNE
and zero otherwise, and after is a time dummy with a value of
zero before and one after the reform. In some specifications we also
replace after by year dummies to investigate the yearly responses.
Controls include the number of employees, sales and equity in nat-
ural logarithmic form. ε is the i.i.d. error term.
The main interest lies in the coefficient γ of the interaction vari-
able (treat ∗ after) in equation (9). This describes the impact of
the reform on treated firms relative to the control group (average
treatment effect for the treated, ATT), if the DD assumptions hold.
The main assumption of the DD method is the parallel time trends
assumption meaning that the variable of interest should behave ex-
actly the same in the treatment and control groups if the policy
change had not been introduced. The method also requires no self-
selection to the groups and no differences in transitory shocks during
the examination period. If these assumptions hold, we are able to
write the DD estimator as follows:
γˆ = (Y¯1a − Y¯1b)− (Y¯0a − Y¯0b),
where Y¯gt is the log of average outcome value over group g at
time t.19 The policy impact γ in equation (9) is the expected value
of parameter γˆ.20
We use a firm fixed-effect strategy. In our case, the fixed-effect
model can be seen as a better option than, for example, the random
18Naturally, the logarithmic model cancels out the zero values. However, the
share of firms distributing zero dividends is rather small in our sample, only 15
%, including both treatment and control firms.
19Here a and b refer to the post- and pre-reform periods and 1 and 0 to the
treatment and control groups respectively.
20See Blundell and Costa Dias (2009).
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effect model or pooled OLS because it allows correlation between
the firm component (ηi) and the regressors.21 Additionally, all mod-
els assume that the error term is not correlated with the regressors
and there is no perfect multicollinearity of regressors (full rank con-
dition).
4.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our primary data come from the Finnish Tax Administration and
includes information on the financial statements and taxation of
Finnish corporations for the period 2000-2007. We use data in an
unbalanced panel form. The unique characteristic of that they con-
tain all Finnish corporations and it allows us to examine closely
various decisions of companies. We also make use of the Amadeus
database. Amadeus provides unconsolidated financial accounting
data on European firms and includes information on ownership re-
lationships between firms. In this study Amadeus data are used
to identify Finnish MNEs and to investigate the changes in profit-
shifting because the main data do not include information on foreign
subsidiaries of Finnish based MNEs. As the abolition of EQT mainly
affected large firms with international operations, we exclude small
firms from our analysis.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the most impor-
tant variables of the main data set we use in the estimations. All
variables are in logarithmic form. Divid represents the log of dis-
tributed dividends calculated for each individual firm. The variable
Invest refers to real investments, Profit represents taxable prof-
its, F − Invest refers to financial investments, Divid − Inc is for
profits repatriated by firms during the financial year, Equity is the
sum of fixed assets held at the end of the tax year, Employees is
the number of employees and Sales represents the turnover during
the fiscal year. Real investments refer here to investments made by
firms in fixed assets during the fiscal year and financial investments
represent investments in liquid assets, including bonds and stocks.
As can be seen, the firms in the control and treatment groups are
broadly of equal size, which is important for our analysis.22 It seems,
21We also offer test results supporting the fixed-effect strategy later on. Esti-
mates of other methods are also available upon request.
22In Appendix 2 we plot the means of main control variables during our
examination period to further emphasize that the groups are relatively similar
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however, that the mean of employees is higher in the control than
in the treatment group.
Treatment
Stats Divid Invest Profit F-Invest Divid-Inc Equity Employees Sales
Mean 14.519 13.085 14.028 14.229 12.490 16.011 4.682 16.482
Median 14.499 13.128 14.127 14.493 12.591 16.001 4.714 16.500
Sd 2.281 2.434 2.672 2.845 3.220 2.377 1.820 2.245
Min 6.579 3.296 -4.605 -1.783 -2.207 7.203 0.000 6.310
Max 22.070 20.866 22.573 21.092 22.304 24.433 10.449 24.154
N 1731 3076 2598 700 3383 3272 3348 3163
Control
Stats Divid Invest Profit F-Invest Divid Inc Equity Employees Sales
Mean 14.089 13.210 14.090 14.366 12.054 15.960 5.442 16.812
Median 14.123 13.437 14.262 14.725 12.357 16.158 5.768 17.152
Sd 1.890 2.359 1.986 2.509 2.546 1.896 1.587 2.052
Min 2.813 5.182 4.257 5.974 -0.020 8.172 0.000 4.739
Max 22.110 19.585 22.118 19.432 20.614 23.593 9.361 23.208
N 1455 1806 1620 502 1901 1860 1909 1832
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the data 2000-2007: treatment and
control groups
We introduce Figure 1 to illustrate that there was considerable
bunching at the tax threshold of EQT before the reform. The Figure
plots the share µ of minimum tax divided by the sum of corporate
tax and tax surpluses in our sample of Finnish MNEs in 2000-2003.
The variable µ can be interpreted as the ratio of distributed divi-
dends to undistributed profit from current and previous years. The
distribution of µ allows us to examine the burden of EQT: the firm
was obliged to pay EQT if µ > 1 otherwise not. The Figure shows
a noticeable spike around the tax kink (µ = 1) in the otherwise
smooth distribution. This may imply that a considerable number of
firms adjusted their dividend payments at precisely the level where
they can avoid the extra tax burden of EQT. We interpret this as
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Figure 1: The liability of firms to pay EQT (years 2000-2003)
4.3 Identification issues
We recognize four issues which might hamper our identification. The
first is the potential anticipation responses of firms to the announce-
ment of a reform before its actual implementation. In this case the
before-after setting of our analysis is less clear cut. The second po-
tential worry is that the firms in the treatment and control groups
responded differently to the other changes of TR2005. The third
worry is that the reform may not have been exogenous but rather
an endogenous response to economic conditions. The last issue re-
lates to the selection of firms in the control and treatment groups.
The next few paragraphs argue that these issues are not too serious
to destroy our identification.
Anticipation could be a problem because TR2005 was announced
already in November 2003. In Figure 2 we plot the average annual
log of dividends in the control and treatment groups from 2000 to
2007 to describe how well our main identifying assumption holds in
practise. The Figure shows that there was an increase in means in
both groups in 2003, which, in line with the study by Kari et al.
(2008) reflects the expected general tightening of personal dividend
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taxes. Kari et al. (2008) found clear anticipation in dividend pay-
ments among small firms in 2003 and 2004, but in 2003 alone among
large (listed) firms.
The difference in means of dividends appears to be relatively sta-
ble until 2003. However, the means seem to diverge in 2003 and
the difference is even larger in 2004. This suggests that some antic-
ipation happened before implementation of the reform. Right after
the reform in 2005, the difference between the means of dividend

















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Confidence interval Confidence interval
Treatment Mean Control Mean
Figure 2: Mean of Log(Dividends): treatment and control groups
We suggest two options to solve the anticipation question. The
first approach is to test whether or not the parallel time trend as-
sumption holds by considering yearly responses before the reform
implementation. Alternatively we may drop the observations of 2003
and 2004 from our data and use 2000-2002 as the pre-reform period,
and thus examine how robust our main results are. We consider the
issue by using both approaches in our result section.
As to the second issue, we believe that the control and treatment
groups faced these other changes in TR2005 apart from the aboli-
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tion of EQT in a broadly similar manner. Support for this view is
received from the paper by Kari et al. (2009), which did not find
any response after 2005 among large listed firms. Thus we believe
that the abolition of EQT was the major element of the reform that
affected large firms.23
Thirdly, the DD method assumes that the policy change is exoge-
nous to economic agents. Otherwise the method would offer biased
impact estimates. Thus, the reform should not have been imple-
mented on the grounds of economic conditions (for example to boost
MNEs economic activity). In our case, the repeal of the imputation
system was a response to an ECJ ruling which held the full impu-
tation system to be inconsistent with EU legislation. Therefore, the
tax reform was not driven by Finnish economic conditions.
The fourth possible identification problem is the choice of the
control group. The DD method assumes that the control group
is chosen exogenously. According to the descriptive statistics, the
control and treatment groups seem to be relatively equal in size.
Besides, we use pre-reform (years 2000-2002) information to identify
the treatment and control groups. Thus we believe that the control
group, in the form we have defined it, is a good counterfactual for
the treatment group.
To assess the robustness of our results, we will use Amadeus
data to investigate behavioral changes by subsidiaries with different
control group assumptions. However, our primary data do not allow
us to perform similar robustness checks.
4.4 Results on dividend payments
We use the DD method to analyse the effects of the abolition of
the EQT on MNEs’ behavior compared to other large Finnish firms.
The estimations are made using an unbalanced panel for the years
from 2000 to 2007 and the estimation strategy used is a fixed-effect
model.24
23As mentioned in Section 2, an additional change in the tax system was the
special tax treatment of dividends received by financial institutions. However,
it is not a relevant change as we consider present outcome variables. It would
be relevant, for example, if we were interested in the composition of investments
after the reform.
24We also perform estimations using a balanced panel. These results are
not statistically different from the estimates with an unbalanced panel. The
Hausman test suggests using the firm-level fixed effect model instead of the
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The results concerning dividend payments are shown in Table 2.
While the first two columns capture the total effect of the reform
on log of dividend payments, columns 3 and 4 present the possible
anticipation responses using year dummies for 2003 and 2004 multi-
plied by the treatment dummy.25 The coefficients in columns 5 and
6 are estimated similarly as those in columns 1 and 2, but excluding
the years 2003 and 2004 from the data. The odd columns give the
results without any control variables and the even columns for the
estimates with the full set of controls.
In accordance with theoretical predictions, the results suggest
that the firms in the treatment group increased their dividend pay-
ments relative to the control group after the reform. We find that
the estimate of the interaction term ‘after’ (refers here to years 2005,
2006 and 2007) multiplied by the treatment group dummy variable
is positive and significant with or without control variables (at the
5 per cent level). As the dependent variable is in a logarithmic form
and we are using a linear model, the estimate of the interaction vari-
able can be interpreted directly as a percentage change among the
treated firms. The estimate suggests that the average increase in
dividend payments by MNEs was approximately 23 per cent.
As stated above, there are reasons to believe that some MNEs
may have anticipated the repeal of EQT in 2004 and even in 2003.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 we include the interaction terms of
the treatment and year dummies 2003 and 2004 in the model. The
coefficients of interaction would be statistically different from zero if
there were differences in dividend payments between the treatment
and control groups already before 2005. This could be interpreted as
anticipation of the reform and upset our main identifying assump-
tion. In both years we find positive interaction coefficients that are
nevertheless not even close to being statistically significant and the
quantitative values of the estimates are rather small.
Another way to test this issue is to perform robustness checks by
excluding the years 2003 and 2004 from the data. The estimates
random effect model. At the level of 899.22 (chi 2(5)), the null hypothesis of
firm-specific effects uncorrelated with the regressors is rejected. However, it
seems that the coefficient of interest is not very sensitive to the method used.
In addition, the results with pooled OLS are also very much in line with the
baseline fixed-effect estimates. The results using random effect estimations and
pooled OLS are available upon request.
25The results in columns 3 and 4 are made using data only for the period
2000-2004.
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in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 without data for the years 2003 and
2004 are larger than our main results in columns 1 and 2. How-
ever, the estimates are not statistically different from the base case
estimates. Hence we conclude that we do not observe clear antici-
pation effects even though Figure 2 previously suggested otherwise.
This underpins our main identification assumption of parallel time
trends. Notice also that our baseline estimates rather underestimate
the response of MNEs if anticipation occurred.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D) Log(D)
After*Treatment 0.233** 0.231** 0.251** 0.243*
(0.103) (0.102) (0.121) (0.118)
Treatment *2003 0.025 0.002
(0.078) (0.075)
Treatment *2004 0.056 0.066
(0.089) (0.100)
Firm effects X X X X X X
Year X X X X X X
Full control set X X X
Observations 2,835 2,835 1,923 1,923 2,069 2,069
R-squared 0.022 0.057 0.073 0.116 0.045 0.066
Number of groups 548 548 502 502 534 534
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Estimation results: dependent variable the log of dividend
payment
4.5 Results on investments
Our predictions in Section 3 suggest that EQT may increase invest-
ments by MNEs in the parent’s h-country. Thus we expect to see
a decrease in investments after the repeal of EQT among Finnish
MNEs. This prediction applies for both real and financial invest-
ments.
The estimates for the real investment impacts are in Table 3.
The dependent variable, log of real investments, describes here the
firm’s yearly investments in machinery, equipments and buildings.
The estimation applies the same method and also the set of controls
is the same as previously, see equation (9). The estimate in the first
column is performed without controls and the one in the second
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column is with the full set of control variables.
The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is positive
without controls and negative after including controls. Both esti-
mates are clearly statistically insignificant. The small size of the
point estimates further stress the conclusion that the abolition of





Firm effects X X
Year X X
Full control set X
Observations 4,364 4,364
R-squared 0.000 0.068
Number of groups 670 670
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Estimation results: dependent variable the log of real invest-
ments
Another way to use repatriated foreign profits with a similar ef-
fect on EQT liability was to invest in financial assets in the parent’s
home country, implying a decrease in investments after the repeal
of EQT. We estimated these effects with several different definitions
for financial assets and using the same approach as above. The
estimations did not give any responses among the treated firms.26
Therefore, we conclude that in contrast to theoretical predictions
EQT seems not to have affected Finnish MNEs’ investment deci-
sions.
4.6 Results on repatriation decisions - dividends and profit
shifting
In Section 3 we discussed the incentive effects of EQT on intra-
company dividends and profit-shifting by MNEs. The analysis sug-
gested an increase in dividend repatriations and a decrease in profit-
shifting after the repeal of EQT in 2005.
26The results are available upon request.
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To investigate the effects on intra-company dividends we are
forced to use a variable describing all dividend income received from
domestic and foreign subsidiaries as well as minority shareholdings.
Therefore, this variable measures repatriated dividends from foreign
subsidiaries imprecisely. However, the tax reform did not change
the taxation of domestic dividends or foreign dividends from minor-
ity holdings. And even if there had been some changes we have no
reason to believe that that they would have affected our treatment
and control groups differently. We use the same estimation strategy
as before. The dependent variable is now the log of dividend income
and we use the same set of control variables as previously.
The results are in Table 4. In both columns 1 and 2 the coef-
ficients are positive and statistically significant without and with
control variables. Thus it seems clear that dividend income to par-
ents increased among the treated companies compared to the control
group after the reform. The magnitude of this response is high, an
increase of approximately 23 per cent.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log(Divid inc) Log(Divid inc)
After*Treatment 0.261** 0.228**
(0.106) (0.103)
Firm effects X X
Year X X
Full control set X
Observations 4,645 4,645
R-squared 0.045 0.128
Number of groups 681 681
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Estimation results: dependent variable the log of dividend
income
Our final question is to study the effects on profit-shifting by ex-
amining the changes both in subsidiary and parent company profits.
The empirical literature on tax-motivated profit-shifting includes
several different approaches to identify the effects on profit-shifting.
While one group of studies follows an indirect strategy by measur-
ing the impact of tax rate differences on the profitability of foreign
subsidiaries (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994, and Huizinga and Laeven,
2008), various studies examine more directly the effects of taxes
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on transfer prices and financial structures (e.g. Bartelsman and
Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003).
In this section we use the Amadeus database for the years 2000-
2006. The data include financial information on national enter-
prises and MNEs, including their subsidiaries and parent companies.
The profit variable used in our analysis is earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT), which is commonly used in related studies (e.g.
Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Our estimation strategy is as earlier,
see equation (9). Controls includes the cost of employees, fixed as-
sets, turnover and sales. The variable after refers to the years 2005
and 2006.
First we estimate the reform’s effects on the profits of subsidiaries
of Finnish MNEs. As noted in the theory section, we expect to de-
tect an increase in subsidiaries’ profits because the reform abolished
the tax incentive to shift profits from f-country to h-country. To
offer credible estimates we use two different groups of firms as con-
trols. The first group comprises European subsidiaries of Swedish
based MNEs. The second control group is formed from domestic
subsidiaries of Finnish corporate groups which do not have overseas
operations. The variable treat equals one if the foreign (European)
subsidiary is owned by a Finnish MNE and zero otherwise. Again
the main identifying assumption is that the control and treatment
groups have parallel trends before intervention, see discussion in the
Method section.27
The results are in Table 5. The first two columns contain the
results for the estimations using the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs
as the control group and the last two columns give the results for the
estimations with Finnish subsidiaries as the control group. Again,
the first and third columns contain the results for models without
controls and the second and fourth columns provide estimates for
models with a full set of controls.
The estimates imply that the profits of subsidiaries of Finnish
MNEs rose significantly compared to profits in the control groups.
The increase in profits is in the range of 10 to 12 per cent being
seemingly stable irrespective of the control group applied. This sug-
gests the conclusion that, in the pre-reform regime, Finnish MNEs
27Figure 4 in Appendix 2 describes the mean of log EBIT in the treatment and
two control groups. The parallel time trend assumption seems to hold relatively
well.
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did use intra-firm transactions to lower their overseas profits as a
response to the threat of an extra tax burden in the form of EQT.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT) Log(EBIT)
After*Treatment 0.109* 0.106* 0.118* 0.119*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.067) (0.065)
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Full control set X X
Observations 13350 13350 12537 12537
R-squared 0.035 0.626 0.038 0.407
Number of groups 3196 3196 2706 2706
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Estimation results: dependent variable the log of EBIT (sub-
sidiary)
We are also interested in the impact of the reform on the par-
ent companies’ profits. However, we cannot make a clear prediction
of the sign of the response. In our empirical analysis the outcome
variable is again EBIT, including both profits from sales and divi-
dend income. If MNEs used intra-firm transactions to shift profits
to Finland before the reform, this should be reflected in the profits
of the parent companies in decreasing EBIT after the reform. On
the other hand, if we observe, as we did, an increase in parents’ div-
idend income, this would increase EBIT. Now if both changes were
somewhat equal in size, the response in terms of the total profits
of MNEs’ parents would be zero. Therefore, the prediction of the
effect of the reform on the parents’ EBIT is that the change was
close to zero. Unfortunately the Amadeus data do not allow us to
distinguish between these two possible channels.
To estimate the change in parent companies’ profits we apply the
same method as above and use EBIT from the Amadeus database
to measure profits. Swedish MNEs are used as the control group.
The results are given in Table 6 where the first column is without
and the second is with control variables.
The estimates are positive even though neither of them is statis-
tically significant. Hence there is no evidence of a change in the ac-
counting profits reported by the parent companies of Finnish MNEs
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after the reform. The most valid point estimate, in column 2, is
quantitatively very close to zero and the clustered standard error is
large, implying that the 95 per cent confidence interval captures a
lot of both negative as well as positive values. This result is in line
with the theoretical prediction and suggests the conclusion that the
increase in dividend income received by the parent and the decrease







Full control set X
Observations 5943 5943
R-squared 0.020 0.229
Number of groups 1304 1304
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Estimation results: dependent variable the log of profits
(parent)
To sum up, we only observe changes in financial decisions (divi-
dends and reported profits) and no responses in real decisions. This
is in line with many earlier empirical studies and also with the idea
of a hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation suggested by Slem-
rod (1992). According to this model, the timing choices of economic
transactions are the most sensitive to taxes. The second tier contains
financial and accounting decisions like dividend and profit-shifting
responses and at the bottom of the hierarchy with the least response
are real decisions like investments and labor supply.
4.7 Calculation of standard errors
As we use a standard simple linear difference-in-difference estima-
tion procedure to estimate the effect of the reform, there is a possible
problem of inconsistent standard errors caused by the serial corre-
lation problem. This problem was emphasized by Bertrand et al.
(2004). They propose several options to help to solve this problem.
When simple parametric econometric corrections work poorly, non-
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parametric correction by bootstrapping works well if the number of
states (in our case firms) is high enough. There are also two simpler
methods which Bertrand et al. propose: first, aggregation of data
into two separate periods: pre and post groups, and, second, one
can allow a different covariance structure for errors within firms at
different times.
We already applied the latter two methods in our estimations
above when we clustered standard errors, and estimated the effects
on the post period only without distinguishing year effects. We also
performed estimations with parametric econometric corrections us-
ing AR(1) structure for errors. However, this did not change the
results considerably. Since we have at least 500 firms per year, de-
pending on the specification and data in use, we are able to calculate
standard errors using the block bootstrap method. Table 7 offers the
results of the pre/post examinations for all our dependent variables.
It seems that in our case the standard errors are not very sensitive
to the way we calculate them. Therefore, we can trust our baseline
results with fairly high confidence.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Log(D) Log(In) Log(D I) Log(EB) Log(EB)
After*Treatment 0.231** -0.024 0.228** 0.106* 0.013
(0.106) (0.090) (0.108) (0.065) (0.085)
Number of groups 548 670 681 3196 1304
Block bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependents are by columns: 1) Finnish firms’ Log of dividend payments, 2) Finnish firms’ Log
of real investments, 3) Finnish firms’ Log of dividend income,4) Finnish MNEs’ subsidiaries’ Log of
EBIT, and 5) Finnish and Swedish MNEs’ Log of EBIT.
Table 7: Estimation results with the full set of controls: dependents
are all presented in the paper – standard errors calculated by block
bootstrapping
5 Conclusions
We analyze the effects of a company-level tax on dividend payments,
which treats differently the foreign and domestic-source profits of a
multinational enterprise (MNE). This tax, the so-called equalization
tax (EQT), was a common element of European imputation systems
until 2005. The systems were largely repealed because the European
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Court of Justice considered them to be inconsistent with the EU
Treaties.
Theoretical analyses have pointed out that EQT establishes a
kink in a firm’s tax rate on dividend distributions and tends to af-
fect various financial decisions by an MNE. Dividend distributions
above the kink are subject to extra tax costs. Therefore the tax may
decrease dividend payments compared to a tax with a linear struc-
ture. Other predictions made by theoretical models are that EQT
increases investments in the MNE’s home country and strengthens
incentives to repatriate foreign profits using transfer pricing rather
than intra-company dividends.
We estimated the effects of EQT using a recent tax reform in
Finland as an experiment. In line with our theoretical hypotheses
we found substantial evidence of the effect on dividend distributions.
We estimate that the reform caused dividends to increase by an av-
erage of 23 per cent in affected firms. This result is in line with
earlier empirical observations that have found dividends to be sen-
sitive to taxes (e.g. Chetty and Saez, 2005, and Poterba, 2004, for
general dividend taxes and Bond et al., 1996, for EQT).
We also observe an increase in foreign intra-company dividends
as well as a modest increase in the profits of foreign subsidiaries of
Finnish MNEs. Both results are in line with the predictions of the
theoretical model and seem to indicate a switch from profit-shifting
to openly distributed intra-company dividends.
Contrary to theoretical predictions, we do not perceive any evi-
dence for a drop in home-country real or financial investments after
the repeal of EQT. In this respect our results support the hierarchy
of behavioral responses to taxation suggested by Slemrod (1992).
According to this view, timing effects and financial choices are the
most sensitive to tax changes and the least sensitive are real eco-
nomic choices such as investments.
Our results also add to the previous studies on the 2005 tax
reform in Finland (Kari et al., 2008 and 2009). Their results suggest
that large listed companies did not alter their dividend payment
behaviour after the reform. They focus on personal-level dividend
taxes and ignore the changes in company-level tax structures such as
EQT. Our estimations show instead clear impacts on the dividend
payments among firms affected by the EQT in the pre-reform regime.
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Appendix 1
This technical appendix presents the solution to the model set up in
Section 3.1 of the main text. The interpretation of results is given
in Section 3.2. The stylized model considers financial decisions of a
MNE operating in two countries, the h-country and the f-country.
The analysis focuses on the parent’s decisions in a long-run equilib-
rium. Section 3.1 defines the MNEs goal, budget constraints and
technological restrictions. The equations of motion for the stocks of
capital at home and abroad are as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t), K(0) = K0
K˙(t) = I∗(t), K∗(0) = K∗0 .
The current-value Lagrangean for the model is
L = H + q1{(1− τ)[Π(K) + C]−D}+ q2D+ (A1)
q3De + C + q4Q+ q5D
∗ + q6
with H = γ(D +De)−Q+ λ1{(1− τ)[Π(K) + C] +D
∗ +Q−
D − (1 + τe)De}+ λ2{(1− τ
∗)[Π(K∗)− C − c(C)]−D∗},
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where H is the Hamiltonian for the problem, λ1 and λ2 are the
shadow prices of the domestic and foreign stocks of capital K and
K∗ respectively, q1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the upper constraint
for D and qi, i=2, . . . ,6, are the Lagrange multipliers of the non-
negativity constraints of control variables. We define γ ≡ (1 −
τp)/(1− s), ρ ≡ (1 − τp)r and assume 0 < s ≤ τ and τp ≥ τ , which
imply γ ≤ 1.
The first-order necessary conditions are
∂L/∂D = γ − λ1 − q1 + q2 = 0 (A2)
∂L/∂De = γ − (1 + τe)λ1 + q3 = 0 (A3)
∂L/∂D∗ = λ1 − λ2 + q5 = 0 (A4)
∂L/∂C = (1− τ)λ1 − (1 + c
′
)(1− τ ∗)λ2 + (1− τ)q1 + q6 = 0 (A5)
∂L/∂Q = −1 + λ1 + q4 = 0 (A6)
λ˙1 = ρλ1 − (1− τ)Π
′
(K)[λ1 + q1] (A7)




plus a complementary slackness condition for each of the six con-








∗(t)e−ρt = 0. (A9)
We will start from financing choices and then move on to in-
vestment and repatriation decisions. Assume that no profit-shifting
occurs (C = 0). The budget constraints of the parent and sub-
sidiary, defined in section 3.1, imply that, in the steady state where
K˙ = K˙∗ = 0, the MNE repatriates D∗ = (1 − τ ∗)Π(K∗) and dis-
tributes G = (1− τ)Π(K)+ (1− τe)D
∗. The latter equation implies
De > 0 and q3 = 0. The steady state value of λ1 is now obtained
from condition (A3):
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λ1 = γ/(1 + τe). (A10)
Hence λ1 < 1. Using (A10) and (A2) we conclude that q1 > 0
implying that the upper constraint for D is binding, D = (1 −
τ)Π(K). The value of the shadow price q1 is:
q1 = τeγ/(1 + τe). (A11)
The MNE’s financing preferences are evaluated by using pairwise
comparisons investigating the costs and benefits of a change in the
financing structure while keeping the capital stock constant. The
preferences between new share issues and retained foreign-source
profits can be found out by measuring the profitability of substi-
tuting new share issues for retained foreign-source profits, which is






− 1 < 0. (A12)
The negative sign implies that foreign source profits strictly dom-
inate new share issues. Next, consider the benefits from a policy
change that substitutes foreign-source profits for domestic profits
while keeping investments and new share issues constant. Formally










Since τe > 0, the net benefit is positive implying that the foreign-
source dividends is the preferred form of financing.
The cost of capital for h-country investment can be derived by
inserting (A10) and (A11) into (A7). This gives
Π’(K) = ρ/[(1 + τe)(1− τ)]. (A14)
In a combination of a full imputation system with τe = τ/(1− τ)
and a uniform rate on capital income and corporate profits, τp = τ ,
we obtain Π’(K) = (1− τ)r < r.
The net benefits from using transfer pricing can be analysed by
calculating ∂L/∂C as in (A5). Assume that the MNE is in a steady
28See Sinn (1987), ch. 4.2.
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state and has D∗ > 0 implying λ1(t) = λ2(t) by (A4). By inserting
(A10), (A11) and (A4) into (A5) and rearranging, we obtain:
c’(C) = (1 + τe)
(1− τ)γ + q6
(1− τ ∗)γ
− 1. (A15)
Assume C > 0 implying c’ > 0 and q6 = 0 and obtain the
following condition (1 + τe)(1 − τ) > (1 − τ
∗) for the profitability
of a policy of increasing C by one euro and financing this from a
corresponding reduction in intra-company dividends (before taxes).
In a full imputation system with τe = τ/(1−τ), the condition always
applies.
Consider briefly the extension of the model which adds the par-
ent’s financial investments F with a constant rate of return i = r.
This can be accomplished by including investments in financial as-
sets E = F˙ and interest income net of domestic corporate tax
(1−τ)iF in the parent’s budget constraint. Additionally an equation
of motion for F and a non-negativity constraint for F are needed.
Assume first no income shifting.
Combining the equations of motion for the shadow prices of K
and F gives the condition for the steady-state stock of real capital:
Π’ = i = r. Assume a uniform tax rate on capital τp = τ to sim-
plify. Substituting it and the condition Π’ = i = r into (A7), yields
q1 = 0. Now (A2) and (A3) give q3 > 0 implying De = 0 by the
complementary slackness conditions. From the budget constraint
we obtain E = D∗ > 0. In this steady state solution, the parent
distributes the domestic profits as dividends and invests all repatri-
ated foreign profits in financial assets. The relevant transversality
condition corresponding to (A9) is satisfied despite the continuous
growth of the firm’s stock of financial assets (the shadow prices and
the stocks of real capital K and K∗ are constants and the stock
of financial capital F grows at a decreasing rate implying that the
transversality condition holds, see Kari - Yla¨-Liedenpohja 2005).
Allowing both income shifting and investment in financial assets
provides the following steady-state solution in the case of an internal
equilibrium for transfer pricing: the firm shifts from the f-country an
amount satisfying (A15), denote C = Cˆ < Π(K∗)− c(Cˆ). The rest
is repatriated as intra-company dividends D∗/(1 − τ ∗) = Π(K∗) −
c(Cˆ)− Cˆ. The parent’s stock of real capital K is determined by the
condition Π’ = r. It distributes all profits taxed in the h-country
35
D = (1 − τ)(Π + Cˆ + iF ), and invests repatriated intra-company
dividends in financial assets E = D∗. Foreign-source dividends are


























Figure 3: Mean of Log(turnover) and Log(capital) from 2000 to 2007:
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Figure 5: Mean of Log(EBIT) from 2000 to 2006: treatment and two
control groups
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